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Book Reviews: POLITICAL THEORY

June 1993

Willful Liberalism: Voluntarism and Individuality in
Political Theory and Practice. By Richard E. Flathman. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992. 232p.
$31.50 cloth, $13.95 paper.
This is an elegant and studied little volume, rather
more difficult than it lets on. Flathman wants to argue
that liberals are sorely in need of a more robust understanding of the will and individuality than they now
possess, that they (or we) should be enthusiastically
embracing what might seem to be some tendentious
commitments about the partial but inescapable opacity
of other selves. He does so by working through a large
number of texts and authors-some only contentiously
called liberal (Hobbes); others not conceivably liberal
(William of Ockham, Augustine, Nietzsche); and still
others not obviously interested in anything narrowly
political at all (Wittgenstein, William James). The exegeses, sometimes dense and always deft, are aimed at
excavating and reclaiming that robust understanding we
allegedly lack. So they are not in the first instance
intended for, say, Hobbes scholars or James scholars.
Flathman does not quite explain his impatience with
reigning liberal theories. I take it his sense is that there is
too much sweet reasonableness, too much of a community dedicated to shared principles of justice and public
debate. But this vision is not just an implausible attempt
to fashion society as a learned graduate seminar. It is
also a bit soporific; and one would have to worry that the
individuals composing it were bland, colorless, interchangeable. Or so, I conjecture, Flathman thinks.
That may make it sound as if Flathman thinks that
individualism (or "individuality") is somehow the opposite of being socially situated (and surely many recent
antiliberals write that way). What emerges from Flathman's juggling of these notions (under titles like "Individuality and Plurality, Sociality and Politicality," "Sociality, Individuality, Plurality, and Politics," etc.) is a
sharp riposte to any such misbegotten notion. Flathman
may want to celebrate partially opaque individuals with
eccentrically strong wills; but he realizes full well that
only in certain kinds of communities or social orders can
such individuals emerge in the first place. Readers who
still believe that liberalism is somehow a presociological
or antisocial doctrine would be well advised to dwell on
this strand of his argument.
There is something mildly paradoxical about the structure of Flathman's position. Think of a theory as a web
of beliefs and leave it an open question (an "empirical
question," as they say in the trade) how densely tangled
together the strands of the web are and whether some
parts of the web are relatively independent of others.
Hence arises an antinomy such that while theories of
individuality must be independent enough that we can
imagine lifting them from Ockham and inserting them
into liberalism, they must not be so independent that
they are just freely spinning gears stuck on the side of
the real conceptual machinery (or else inserting them
will not matter).

474

American Political Science Review

Vol. 87, No. 2

There is, indeed, logical room for that. But at the very
least, one would like to hear more about what "appropriating"or "inserting"these commitmentsinto liberalism would mean. Nor, presumably, is a liberal (or any)
web of beliefs, built like a Motorola color television, so
that we might just snap out the old defective module
labeled "views of self and society" and insert the new
one. Presumably, that is, inserting these commitments
will somehow change the rest of liberalism if only by
putting other liberalcommitmentsin a new context. But
Flathmandoes not take up the constructivetask of even
sketching what our new and improved liberalism will
look like in any serious detail.
I do not mean to catalog the failings of Flathman's
book, but to suggest how much it opens up for us, how
much furtherwork along these lines might be done. In a
debate as viciously repetitive as that between liberals
and their critics, the act of putting a quirky, talented,
provocative sketch on the table is remarkable.
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